Commentary on Vul et al.'s (2009) “Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cognition” by Nichols, Thomas E. & Poline, Jean-Baptist
Commentary on Vul et al.’s (2009)
‘‘Puzzlingly High Correlations
in fMRI Studies of Emotion,
Personality, and Social
Cognition’’
Thomas E. Nichols1,2,3 and Jean-Baptist Poline4
1Clinical Imaging Centre, GlaxoSmithKline, London; 2Centre for Functional MRI of the Brain, University of Oxford,
Oxford, United Kingdom; 3Department of Biostatistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; 4Institut d’Imagerie
Biomedicale, Neurospin, CEA, Gif sur Yvette, France
ABSTRACT—The article ‘‘Puzzlingly High Correlations in
fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and Social Cogni-
tion’’ (Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009, this is-
sue) makes a broad case that current practice in
neuroimaging methodology is deficient. Vul et al. go so far
as to demand that authors retract or restate results, which
we find wrongly casts suspicion on the confirmatory in-
ference methods that form the foundation of neuroimaging
statistics. We contend the authors’ argument is overstated
and that their work can be distilled down to two points
already familiar to the neuroimaging community: that the
multiple testing problem must be accounted for, and that
reporting of methods and results should be improved. We
also illuminate their concerns with standard statistical
concepts such as the distinction between estimation and
inference and between confirmatory and post hoc infer-
ences, which makes their findings less puzzling.
We are happy that Vul, Harris, Winkielman, and Pashler (2009,
this issue) have generated such a stimulating discussion over
fundamental statistical issues in neuroimaging. However, the
issues raised are well known to experienced brain imaging
researchers, and the article could be distilled to two points that
have already received much attention in the literature. The first
one is that brain imaging has a massive multiple-testing problem
(MTP) which must be accounted for in order to have trustworthy
inferences, and the presence of this problem requires careful
distinction between corrected and uncorrected inferences.
Second, articles in neuroimaging have methods descriptions
that are confusing or incomplete, which is a disservice to sci-
entific discourse especially as neuroimaging reaches into new
applied areas.
Finding solutions to the MTP has been an active area of re-
search during the past two decades. We now have consensus
methods that are widely accepted and used (see, e.g., Chapters
18–21 of Friston, 2006, or Chapter 14 of Jezzard, Matthews, &
Smith, 2001). The two types of commonly used inference
methods are those that control the family-wise error rate (FWE;
Nichols & Hayasaka, 2003) and those that control the false
discovery rate (FDR; Genovese, Lazar, & Nichols, 2002). FWE
is the chance of one or more false positives, and Bonferroni and
random field theory thresholds are just two methods that control
FWE. A statistic image with a valid 5% FWE threshold is
guaranteed to have no false positives at all with 95% confidence.
FDR is a more lenient measure of false positives, and a valid 5%
FDR threshold will allow as many as 5% of the suprathreshold
voxels to be false positives on average. Both FWE and FDR
methods can be applied voxel-wise, as a threshold on a statistic
image, or cluster-wise, as a threshold on the size of clusters after
applying an arbitrary cluster-forming threshold.
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Whether FWE or FDR, voxel-wise or cluster-wise, corrected
inferences must be used to ensure that results are not attribut-
able to chance. Such corrected inferences are known as confir-
matory inference, a test of a prespecified null hypothesis with
calibrated false-positive risk. This is in distinction to explor-
atory or post hoc inference, in which no attempt is made to
control false positive risk. Reporting and interpreting the voxels
or clusters that survive a corrected threshold is a valid confir-
matory inference and the foundation of brain imaging method-
ology. Complete reporting of these results usually consists of a
corrected P and raw t (equivalently r) value, and in no way does
the unveiling of the t value invalidate this inference.
The authors suggest that that the raw t (equivalently r) scores
that survive a corrected threshold are impossible; this is incor-
rect because they are simply suprathreshold values that should
be reported for what they are: post hoc measures of significance
uncorrected for multiple testing. Crucially, as the raw scores are
uncorrected measures, they are incomparable with a behavioral
correlation that did not arise out of a search over 100,000 tests.
In other words, those values are maximum values over a large
number of comparisons.
This incompatibility issue is also related to how the authors
misinterpret the reliability result (Nunnally, 1970), applying it
to sample correlations when it is statement about population
correlations. There is in fact substantial variation in a sample
correlation about its true population value, with the approximate
standard error of r being 1/
p
n. Thus a sample correlation based
on 25 subjects has an approximate 95% confidence interval of
0.4, and indicates that, in this setting, an r of 0.9 is entirely
consistent with a r of 0.7.1 Moreover, this sampling variability
issue is magnified by the reporting of maximal correlations.
The second essential point of the article is that publications in
neuroimaging have methods descriptions that are confusing or
incomplete. Although this is a point of embarrassment for the
field, it is a point that has been addressed in several publications
(Carter, Heckers, Nichols, Pine, & Strother, 2008; Poldrack
et al., 2007; Ridgway et al., 2008). If there is any misdeed com-
mitted by the nonindependent articles, perhaps it is that they
failed to fully label the inferences as post hoc. It is self-evident
that suprathreshold-selected post hoc tests give rise to greater
correlations than do confirmatory tests based on one voxel or
region of interest (Fig. 5 in Vul et al.) and it is not worthy of the
tenor of the note. In particular, we argue that although authors
have the responsibility to clearly and completely describe their
methods and results, readers have the responsibility to under-
stand the technology used and how to correctly interpret the
results it generates. For example, in the field of genetics, whole-
genome association analyses search over hundreds of thousands
of tests for genotype–phenotype correlations and publications
routinely include plots of uncorrected P values (see, e.g., Fig. 4
in The Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium, 2007). Yet we
are unaware of any movement to suppress these plots from
publication, presumably because genetic researchers under-
stand the difference between these massive analyses and can-
didate single-nucleotide-polymorphism analyses in which no
multiplicity is involved.
We must also take issue with the seemingly most compelling
argument of the article, as explained in Figure 4 and the
weather/stock-market correlation example. The problem with
these examples is that they are based entirely on a null-
hypothesis argument (i.e., the total noise case). However, if the
articles used corrected thresholds, then the suprathreshold
voxels will be mostly or entirely true positives.
As reviewed above, a 0.05 voxel-wise FWE threshold guar-
antees no more than a 0.05 chance that any null voxels will
survive the threshold. In this case, Figure 4(a) is totally irrele-
vant (with 95% confidence) and the distribution of supra-
threshold correlations is purely due to true positives. If, instead,
the articles cited use a 0.05 FDR threshold, the suprathreshold
voxels will be a mixture of true and false positives, but the
fraction of false-positive voxels will be no more than 5% on
average.
Finally, we find that the focus on correlation itself is prob-
lematic, as the correlation coefficient entangles estimation of
effect magnitude and inference on a nonzero effect. A much
more informative approach is to separately report significance
and effect magnitude. That is, report significance with a cor-
rected P value and report effect magnitude (still post hoc, of
course) with a unit change in social behavioral score per unit
percent blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) level
change (as recommended in Poldrack et al., 2007). The be-
havioral scores have known scales and properties, and the
percent BOLD change has an approximate interpretation of
percent change in blood flow (Moonen & Bandettini, 2000).
Reporting such measures will provide more interpretable and
comparable measures for the reader.
The authors seem to be arguing that the field of neuroimaging
should turn away from inference on where an effect is localized
and focus instead solely on estimation of effect magnitude as-
suming a known location (Saxe, Brett, & Kanwisher, 2006). This
is a significant shift in perspective that justifies ample and
perhaps strident scientific discourse, but should not suggest that
standard inferential practice is erroneous.
We would like to thank the authors for an engaging article that
raises issues that apply to every neuroimaging study. However,
we maintain that the community would have been better served
if the alarmist rhetoric had been replaced by a measured dis-
cussion that made connections to standard statistical practice,
distinguishing between estimation and inference and between
confirmatory and post hoc inferences, and had simply ac-
knowledged the incomparability of reported post hoc imaging
correlations with other correlations in the psychology literature.
1More accurate confidence intervals can be computed with Monte Carlo or
Fisher’s Z transformation and may be shorter than the 0.4 approximate in-
terval. However such intervals would still demonstrate the substantial sampling
variability about the population value.
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